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The application of socio-economic rights to 
private law
SANDRA LIEBENBERG*
Prologue
It was a great honour for me to serve with Ig Rautenbach as a member of the techni-
cal committee advising the constitutional assembly on the bill of rights in the 1996 
constitution. Ig was supportive of the innovative provisions in the bill of rights – in-
cluding socio-economic rights, a separate clause dealing with children’s rights and 
the horizontal application of fundamental rights. He understood the aspiration of 
many people that the bill of rights should facilitate the transformation of the unjust 
social and economic legacy of the colonial and apartheid eras. He had faith in the 
ability of the courts, assisted by the general limitations clause, to develop principled 
and pragmatic responses to the challenges posed by these innovative provisions.
Ig’s considerable experience and expertise in comparative constitutional law, his 
openness to novel approaches, and his wicked sense of humour contributed enor-
mously to the smooth functioning and progress of the work of the technical commit-
tee and the committees of the constitutional assembly it advised.
This article, which explores the application of socio-economic rights in private 
law, is dedicated to Ig.
1  Introduction: socio-economic rights and private power
The constitution is explicitly committed to redressing and transforming socio-eco-
nomic exclusion and marginalisation. This is manifest, amongst other constitutional 
provisions, in the entrenchment of a comprehensive range of socio-economic rights 
read together with the provisions relating to substantive equality,1 land reform2 and 
environmental rights.3 Moreover, the constitution contains a number of express pro-
visions signalling that the rights and values in the bill of rights are intended to ap-
ply to private relations and to influence the development of the common law and 
customary law. Sections 8(1)-(3) and 39(2) are the primary provisions governing the 
application of the bill of rights to private parties.
In South Africa (as is the case in other societies based on a market economy) 
powerful private actors such as landlords, banks, medical aid schemes, insurance 
* Professor in Human Rights Law, Stellenbosch University. This article is based on material in the 
author’s Adjudicating Socio-Economic Rights under a Transformative Constitution (2008) which 
is supported by a grant from the National Research Foundation (NRF). Any opinion, finding and 
conclusion or recommendation expressed in this material is those of the author and the NRF does not 
accept any liability in regard thereto. Thanks to Proff Lubbe and Naudé for valuable comments on a 
previous draft.
1 s 9. See Albertyn “Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa” 2007 SAJHR 253.
2 S 25 (the property clause) aims to balance the objectives of protecting existing property rights (s 
25(1)-(3)) with the goals of increasing access to property through land reform and property restitu-
tion (s 25(4)-(9)).
3 The environmental clause strives to reconcile the promotion of “justifiable economic and social 
development” with securing “ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources” (s 
24(b)(iii)).
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companies and utility companies delivering public services such as water exercise 
significant control over people’s access to socio-economic rights. Common-law 
rules and institutions structure access to socio-economic resources in diverse areas 
of contract law, property law, delict, family law and succession.4 As Michelman 
observes:
“Suppose everyone has a constitutionally super-valued interest in having ‘access to sufficient food 
and water’. Food-sellers exercising powers under the law of contract to set highly profitable prices 
for their wares, and landowners exercising rights and privileges under the law of property to convert 
land from food production to game parks, may threaten those interests as gravely as any state of-
ficial ever would be likely to do.”
5
In this context, sections 8 and 39(2) are crucial mechanisms to ensure that private 
entities and law can be held accountable for infringements of the socio-economic 
rights in the bill of rights. Cumulatively these provisions establish that no exercise 
of public or private power is immune from critical scrutiny and re-evaluation in the 
light of constitutional rights and values of the constitution. There are no immunised 
zones, only better or worse constitutional justifications for leaving intact, invalida- 
ting or changing the particular legal rule (whatever its source) which is subject to 
challenge.
Any attempt to shield common-law rules from judicial review in terms of con-
stitutional rights and values will operate to entrench and perpetuate the power and 
privileged position of those who already enjoy access to socio-economic resources. 
And it will operate to reinforce the exclusion and marginalisation of those who cur-
rently lack the means to participate meaningfully in the social and economic institu-
tions of society. This will entrench rather than transform South Africa’s legacy of 
colonialism and apartheid which systemically deprived black people of access not 
only to political power, but also of access to a range of socio-economic resources 
and services.
2  Applying socio-economic rights in private law: sections 8 and 39
As noted above, the two main constitutional provisions mandating and providing a 
methodology for the horizontal application of rights in the bill of rights are sections 
8 and 39(2). The interpretation of the two provisions and their interrelationship and 
application remains a source of on-going controversy and debate.6 Despite the appli-
cation of section 8 to the common-law rules of defamation in Khumalo v Holomisa,7 
subsequent jurisprudence of the constitutional court evinces a preference for relying 
on section 39(2) to give effect to the application of rights in the bill of rights in legal 
4 Decisions exemplifying the effect of the rules of succession, personal status and family law on 
people’s access to resources include Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 6 SA 
1 (CC); Volks NO v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 466 (CC); Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 5 SA 331 (CC); 
Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC). 
5 Michelman “The bill of rights, the common law, and the freedom-friendly state” 2003-2004 Miami 
LR 401 414; Brand “Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African constitution” in 
Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2005) 1 39-40.
6 For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Woolman “Application” in Woolman et al (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2005) ch 31. 
7 2002 5 SA 401 (CC).
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relations between private parties,8 or when common law rules are at issue in cases 
involving organs of state.9
The courts have not always been consistent, nor have clear criteria been provided 
as to when it is appropriate to rely on sections 8, 39(2) or a combination of these 
provisions in invalidating or developing common law rules to ensure constitutional 
consistency. This article will not examine this debate in detail. However, I agree 
with the views expressed by Woolman that an independent significance and mean-
ing must be given to section 8.10 It should not simply be ignored in cases which 
give rise to the question whether a right in the bill of rights applies in a legal dispute 
between private entities. I will therefore focus on the significance of both sections 
8 and 39(2) for applying socio-economic rights in legal relations between private 
parties.
2.1  Section 8
2.1.1  Section 8(1)
The statement in section 8(1) that the bill of rights applies to “all law” and binds 
“the judiciary” also suggests, at least on its face, that the bill of rights is intended 
to apply directly also to the common law and customary law in cases involving 
private litigants relying on common law provisions. However, in Khumalo v Holo-
misa, O’Regan J held this interpretation of the binding of the judiciary in section 
8(1) would render section 8(2) and (3) redundant.11 Thus the direct application of 
a right in the bill of rights to the common law in disputes between private par-
ties is primarily governed by sections 8(2) and 8(3). In K v Minister of Safety and 
Security,12 O’Regan J further held that the inclusion of the judiciary in section 8(1) 
together with section 39(2) creates “an expressly normative legal system founded on 
the norms articulated in our constitution”.13
2.1.2  Section 8(2)
Section 8(2) determines under which conditions a right in the bill of rights will bind 
a private party. Its formulation suggests that there are no definitive categories of 
rights or duties which can be excluded from horizontal application in any a-priori 
fashion. Thus section 8(2) provides: “A provision of the bill of rights binds a natural 
or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”
8 See, for example Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC), particularly at par 23-30: constitutional 
challenges to contractual terms should ordinarily occur through the development of the notion of 
public policy consistent with “the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as given expres-
sion by the provisions of the Bill of Rights” (par 29-30). Compare the views of Langa CJ in his 
separate judgment disagreeing with the judgment of Ngcobo J (for the majority) to the extent that 
it holds that that the only acceptable approach to challenging the constitutionality of contractual 
terms is indirect application under s 39(2). The chief justice preferred to keep open the possibility 
of a direct application in terms of s 8 of certain rights in the bill of rights to contractual terms or the 
common law that underlies them (par 186). 
9 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC); Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Pretoria 2007 5 SA 30 (CC); Murray v The Minister of Defence case number 383/2006 
2008 SCA 44 (31 March 2008) (unreported).
10 See Woolman “The amazing, vanishing bill of rights” 2007 SALJ 762.
11 (n 7) par 30-31.
12 2005 6 SA 419 (CC).
13 K case (n 12) par 15 and 19. This case concerned a delictual claim based on vicarious liability against 
an organ of state.
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In Khumalo v Holomisa the constitutional court gave an indication of the con-
siderations relevant to determining whether a right in the bill of rights has direct 
horizontal application.14 The case concerned whether the right of freedom of ex-
pression in section 16 affected the common law requirements in a defamation action 
against the media. The court held that the right of freedom of expression “is integral 
to a democratic society” and is “constitutive of the dignity and autonomy of human 
beings”.15 The media play a central role in upholding democracy and the right to 
freedom of expression enables them to fulfil this role.16 It went on to hold that:
“Given the intensity of the constitutional right in question, coupled with the potential invasion of 
that right which could be occasioned by persons other than the State or organs of State, it is clear that 
the right to freedom of expression is of direct horizontal application in this case as contemplated by 
section 8(2) of the Constitution.”
17
A court must accordingly decide in the context of a particular dispute between pri-
vate parties whether the nature of the particular right at issue in the case, and the 
nature of any duty imposed by that right make it capable and appropriate of ap-
plication in the dispute. The degree to which a particular right will be binding on 
a private party thus depends on a contextual evaluation of the nature of the right 
and duties which are in question in particular cases, and the nature of the private 
entity concerned.18 This inevitably involves a policy judgment as to whether a duty 
imposed by the right should be imposed on a private party in the particular context 
of the case. However, as Currie and De Waal caution, this broad discretion to apply 
the bill of rights horizontally in the context of particular cases “should not be used 
to frustrate the clear intention of the drafters of the 1996 Constitution – to extend 
the direct operation of the provisions of the bill of rights to private conduct”.19 It 
is not necessary for the power of private conduct to approximate that of the state. 
It is enough that the exercise of private rights and private conduct can significantly 
impair the enjoyment of rights by others in society. The commitment of the con-
stitution to transform existing inequitable power relations and patterns of poverty 
supports an expansive interpretation of the provisions in the constitution governing 
horizontal application.
As early as Government of the RSA v Grootboom, the constitutional court suggested 
that at least some of the duties imposed by socio-economic rights were binding on 
private parties. Thus it held that section 26(1) of the constitution imposes “at the very 
least, a negative obligation upon the State and all other entities and persons to desist 
from preventing or impairing the right of access to adequate housing”.20 The court did 
not elaborate on its understanding of the “negative duty” imposed by socio-economic 
rights. However, in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz,21 the court held, in the 
context of housing rights, that “any measure which permits a person to be deprived of 
14 (n 7). 
15 Khumalo case (n 7) par 21.
16 Khumalo case (n 7) par 24.
17 Khumalo case (n 7) par 33.
18 As Cockrell “Private law and the bill of rights: A threshold issue of ‘horizontality’” in Butterworths 
Bill of Rights Compendium (RS 13 Oct 2003) ch 3A 13 notes, s 8 (2) “proceeds on the assumption that 
constitutional rights might be agent-relative and context-sensitive, inasmuch as their direct applica-
tion against private agencies will depend on the circumstances of the case and the characteristics of 
the particular person.”
19 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 53. 
20 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) par 34 – emphasis added.
21 2005 2 SA 140 (CC).
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existing access to adequate housing, limits the rights protected in s 26(1)”.22 It went on 
to observe that such measures could be justified in terms of section 36. This suggests 
that private law rules or conduct which permits people to be deprived of the existing 
access which they enjoy to socio-economic rights is inconsistent with sections 26(1) 
and 27(1) of the constitution, and is subject to justification in terms of section 36.
The situation in relation to the positive duties imposed by socio-economic rights 
is more complex. Sections 26(2) and 27(2) place a duty on the state to adopt positive 
measures to advance access to the relevant rights. Does the fact that sections 26(2) 
and 27(2) expressly place this positive duty on the state imply that the positive du-
ties imposed by socio-economic rights cannot bind private parties in appropriate 
circumstances? Such a reading would confine the scope of sections 26(1) and 27(1) 
to negative duties. There is some suggestion to support this reading in Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) when the court holds:
“We therefore conclude that s 27(1) of the Constitution does not give rise to a self-standing and inde-
pendent positive right enforceable irrespective of the considerations mentioned in s 27(2). Sections 
27(1) and 27(2) must be read together as defining the scope of the positive rights that everyone has 
and the corresponding obligations on the State to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ such rights. 
The rights conferred by ss 26(1) and 27(1) are to have ‘access’ to the services that the State is obliged 
to provide in terms of ss 26(2) and 27(2).” 
23
However, this statement can also be read simply to indicate that any positive duties 
imposed by section 27(1) are not unqualified and that compliance must be assessed 
taking into account the constraints of available resources and the latitude of a rea-
sonable time period for fulfilment. Secondly, it is not incontrovertible that sections 
26(2) and 27(2) exclude all forms of horizontal application.24 Klaaren argues that 
the requirement of “reasonable legislative and other measures” in sections 26(2) and 
27(2) read in conjunction with sections 26(1) and (2) can be interpreted to include 
judicial measures thereby requiring the courts to develop the common law so as to 
promote access to socio-economic rights.25
My preferred approach is not to rely on a rigid and a-contextual distinction between 
negative and positive duties for the purpose of determining the extent of horizontal 
application of the socio-economic rights in sections 26 and 27.26 The purpose of sec-
tions 26 and 27 read as a whole are to protect and advance people’s access to socio-
economic rights. As Ellman observes, “Section 27(2) states part of what the state must 
do to implement these rights; it does not tell us that only the state need do anything.”27 
22 ibid par 34.
23 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) par 39.
24 For a suggestion to this effect, see Pieterse “Indirect horizontal application of the right to have access 
to health care services” 2007 SAJHR 157 163: “Subject to the (express and implied) limitations on 
horizontal application derived from s 8 of the constitution, all obligations inherent in s 27(1)(a) except 
for that set out in s 27(2) should in principle be viewed as capable of attaching to private entities.”
25 See Klaaren “A remedial interpretation of the Treatment Action Campaign decision” 2003 SAJHR 
455 460- 461; Klaaren “An institutional interpretation of socio-economic rights and judicial remedies 
after TAC” in Botha, Van der Walt and Van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transforma-
tive Constitution (2004) 105.
26 For a critique of the negative and positive duties distinction in the context of socio-economic rights, 
see Craven “Assessment of the progress on adjudication of economic, social and cultural rights” 
in Squires, Langford and Thiele (eds) The Road to a Remedy  Current Issues in the Litigation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2005) 27 34-36.
27 Ellman “A constitutional confluence: American ‘state action’ law and the application of South 
Africa’s socio-economic rights guarantees to private actors” in Andrews and Ellman (eds) The Post-
Apartheid Constitutions  Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 444 461. 
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Both public and private institutions and law can operate to unjustifiably deprive peo-
ple of their access to socio-economic rights. Similarly, both public and private law and 
conduct can make it more difficult for people to gain access to these rights.
Section 8(2) suggests a nuanced and contextual approach for determining whether 
in a particular case it is appropriate and reasonable to place either a negative or posi-
tive duty imposed by a particular right in the bill of rights on a private actor. This 
will inevitably be a value judgment which must be made in the light of the trans-
formative commitments and founding values of the constitution. These commit-
ments include the redress of socio-economic deprivations and systemic inequality.
There are many examples which illustrate the potential application of both nega-
tive and positive obligations in the context of socio-economic rights claims to pri-
vate actors. Thus in the context of the right of access to adequate housing, private 
law rules of property which permit people to be unjustifiably deprived of their ac-
cess to adequate housing can be regarded as inconsistent with section 26 of the con-
stitution.28 Similarly, the contractual arrangements between medical aid schemes 
and their members may unreasonably and unjustifiably allow for the termination of 
membership or the coverage of particular medical treatments previously funded.29
Contexts where it may be appropriate to impose positive duties on private actors to 
protect or facilitate people’s access to socio-economic rights may arise from situations 
where there is a special relationship between the parties, or where the private entity 
has significant power to control access to the particular social goods or services. Thus, 
for example, the constitutional court has held that the duty to secure the socio-eco-
nomic rights of children in section 28(1)(c) rests primarily on their parents and fami-
lies, and only in default of such parental or family care, on the state.30 Furthermore, it 
may be appropriate to impose a legal duty on large corporations to make provision for 
the housing needs of their workers in contexts where the company relies primarily on 
migrant labour. The health rights in sections 27, 28(1)(c) and 35(2)(e) can (and I would 
argue, should) be interpreted to place duties on large pharmaceutical companies to 
ensure that their patent rights do not undermine the economic accessibility of crucial 
drugs and medical treatments.31 While such cases may not manifest in a direct claim 
against the corporation concerned, recognition of an obligation on powerful private 
entities not to unjustifiably impede access to critical socio-economic goods and serv-
ices should influence the interpretation of relevant international agreements,32 and 
legislation relevant to pharmaceutical pricing.33
28 See the discussion of Brisley v Drotsky (n 34-42 below) and accompanying text.
29 While the relationship between medical aid schemes and their members is regulated by the Medical 
Schemes Act 131 of 1998, the act nonetheless allows a wide latitude in terms of the autonomy of 
schemes and their members to regulate their contractual arrangements for medical aid.
30 Grootboom case (n 20) par 70-79.
31 On the possible application of s 27 in this scenario, see Ellman (n 27) 444 459-469. 
32 Of particular significance in this context is the World Trade Organisation’s treaty on the Trade Relat-
ed Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the Doha Declaration on that treaty and Public Health 
WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2, 14 Nov 2001.
33 Such legislation in the South African context includes the Patents Act 57 of 1978, the Medicines and 
Related Substances Act 101 of 1965, and the Competition Act 89 of 1998. For a discussion of the signifi-
cance of health care rights to the intellectual property entitlements of pharmaceutical companies, see 
Chirwa “The right to health in international law: Its implications for the obligations of state and non-
state actors in ensuring access to essential medicine” 2003 SAJHR 541; Onyemelukwe “Access to anti-
retroviral drugs as a component of the right to health in international law: examining the application of 
the right in Nigerian jurisprudence” 2007 African Human Rights Law Journal 446. 
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Section 8(2) thus requires courts to do sustained interpretative work in coming to 
grips with the nature of the particular socio-economic right and the duties at stake in 
a legal dispute between private parties. Khumalo v Holomisa suggests that the appli-
cation of any right in the bill of rights to a private party should depend on the power 
of the private party concerned to undermine the interests and values protected by 
the particular right. Given the significant power of a network of private law rules to 
influence access to socio-economic rights, courts should be slow to conclude that a 
particular socio-economic right is not applicable in a dispute between private par-
ties, particularly when the social and economic context reveals significant dispari-
ties of power between the parties.
However, even in cases where the direct horizontal application of a socio-eco-
nomic right on the common law in terms of section 8(2) is acknowledged, the courts 
have tended to minimise the impact of the relevant provision on the common law. 
In Brisley v Drotsky,34 the supreme court of appeal conceded that section 26(3) 
of the constitution could be applied to the common law applicable to the eviction 
by a landlord of a tenant holding over after cancellation of a lease.35 However, it 
neutralised the potential transformative impact of this provision on the common 
law by confining the “relevant circumstances” to which a court must have regard 
in evictions of people from their homes to the existing common law and statutory 
law rules.36 In doing so, it rejected an interpretation which would give a court any 
discretion in relation to an eviction application taking into account a broader set of 
circumstances relating to the dealings between the parties and the personal circum-
stances of the former tenant.37 Although judicial oversight of evictions is a vital 
safeguard, the supreme court of appeal’s interpretation of “relevant circumstances” 
in section 26(3) strips this phrase of substantive significance.38 Its impact on evic-
tions has been mitigated, to some extent, through the application of the provisions 
of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 
19 of 1998 to a tenant holding over subsequent to the lawful termination of a lease 
agreement,39 and the substantive interpretation accorded to this statute by the con-
stitutional court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers.40 However, 
the shadow cast by Brisley v Drotsky still lingers over eviction applications not 
governed by Act 19 of 1998 or similar legislation41 as well as the restrictive interpre-
tation of other legislation authorising evictions.42
34 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA).
35 Brisley case par 40. The prevailing common law rules were laid down in Graham v Ridley 1931 TPD 
476.
36 Brisley case par 42-43.
37 Brisley case par 41; 44-45. 
38 For criticisms of the interpretation in the Brisley case, see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 
(2005) 422-424; Roux “Continuity and change in a transforming legal order: The impact of section 
26(3) of the constitution on South African law” 2004 SALJ 466 484-491. 
39 Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 1 SA 113 (SCA). In Transnet (Pty) Ltd v Zaaiman case no 
326/07 (SECLD) (11 March 2008) unreported, Erasmus J held that a court will generally “be less 
sympathetic to recalcitrant ex-lessees and ex-owners than it is to squatters; not by virtue of legal 
principle, but because usually such persons are less deserving of protection in the circumstances 
surrounding their occupancy” (par 34).
40 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
41 The correctness of the approach in the Brisley case (n 34) to the impact of s 26(3) on the common law 
acquires particular significance in the light of the proposed amendments to Act 19 of 1998 that will 
undo the ruling in the Ndlovu case (n 39) by excluding its application to tenants holding over. See 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Amendment Bill [B8 – 2008] 
s 2.
42 See (n 52) below.
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2.1.3  Section 8(3)
Having established that a right binds the private entity in a particular case, section 
8(3) prescribes the mechanism through which this “horizontal” application is to 
take effect. In the first place a court must consider whether there is legislation which 
gives adequate effect to the right. If not, the court must consider whether an existing 
common-law rule gives effect to the right. If the existing common law rules are de-
ficient in this respect, the court is obliged to develop the common law to give effect 
to the right and may at the same time develop rules of the common law to limit the 
right in accordance with section 36(1).
This provision establishes a preference for giving effect to the horizontal applica-
tion of the rights in the bill of rights through legislative measures. This is under-
standable given the democratic legitimacy of legislation. Apart from being adopted 
by those democratically elected by the people, the legislative process should also 
involve broad and inclusive public deliberation and participation. Such processes 
should ideally enable legislatures to craft nuanced and systemic schemes which take 
into account and attempt to reconcile all conflicting rights, interests and values at 
stake.43 It is therefore preferable that legislation be enacted which gives full effect 
to the socio-economic rights in public and private relationships.
Moreover, an important nexus exists in this context between the duties imposed 
by socio-economic rights on private parties and the duty of the state “to protect” 
the socio-economic rights of more vulnerable members of society against powerful 
private actors.44 This duty to protect places an obligation on the state to enact and 
enforce the necessary legislation to regulate and enable private actors to fulfil their 
duties in socio-economic spheres. Where legislation does exist which regulates con-
stitutional rights, litigants are required to rely on such legislation to protect their 
rights.45
However sound the theoretical justifications for preferring legislative measures 
for giving effect to the horizontal application of socio-economic rights, it is prem-
ised on an idealised conception of the role and functioning of legislatures. This 
conception does not reflect the current realities both in South Africa and other juris-
dictions. The South African parliament and provincial legislatures, like most other 
modern legislatures, are subject to the constraints of time and resource pressures, 
they are at a relative disadvantage to the executive in relation to technical exper-
tise and resources, and subject to capture by powerful business and interest groups 
in society. This situation results in imperfect legislation which may disregard or 
neglect the rights of particular groups, frequently those who are political, economi-
cally and socially marginalised.46
43 The significance of public participation in legislative processes was highlighted in Doctors for Life 
International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC).
44 For a discussion of the state’s “duty to protect” discourse in the context of constitutional proper-
ty law jurisprudence, see Van der Walt “Transformative constitutionalism and the development of 
South African property law” (part I) 2005 TSAR 655 and Van der Walt 2006 TSAR 1.
45 See SA National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) 420 par 52. The court in 
the Grootboom case (n 20) stated: “A right of access to adequate housing also suggests that it is not 
only the State who is responsible for the provision of houses, but that other agents within our society, 
including individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures to provide 
housing” (par 35).
46 For a discussion of the “blind spots” and “burdens of inertia” in legislative processes, see Dixon 
“Creating dialogue about socioeconomic rights: Strong-form versus weak-form judicial review 
revisited” 2007 I Con 391 402-406. 
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In situations where the legislature has not fulfilled its duty to protect socio-eco-
nomic rights by enacting legislation giving effect to these rights, there are manifest 
legal difficulties in the way of obtaining an order to compel the enactment of such 
legislation. In these circumstances, litigants must look to the courts in terms of 
section 8(3) to find a remedy in terms of the existing common law or, where neces-
sary, to develop a new constitutionally sourced remedy to give effect to the relevant 
constitutional rights. In this context, courts have to fulfil their constitutional duty to 
vindicate constitutional rights and should be wary of abdicating this responsibility 
on grounds such as deference to legislative choices. In dissenting from the decision 
of the majority to suspend its declaration of invalidity in respect of the common law 
definition of marriage in Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs to enable parliament to 
come up with a holistic scheme for the recognition of gay marriages,47 O’Regan J 
states:
“There can be no doubt that it is necessary that unconstitutional laws be removed from our statute 
book by Parliament. It is equally necessary that provisions of the common law which conflict with 
the Constitution are developed in a manner that renders them in conformity with it. It would have 
been desirable if the unconstitutional situation identified in this matter had been resolved by Parlia-
ment without litigation. The corollary of this proposition, however, is not that this Court should not 
come to the relief of successful litigants, simply because an Act of Parliament conferring the right 
to marry on gays and lesbians might be thought to carry greater democratic legitimacy than an order 
of this Court. The power and duty to protect constitutional rights is conferred upon the courts and 
courts should not shrink from that duty. The legitimacy of an order made by the Court does not flow 
from the status of the institution itself, but from the fact that it gives effect to the provisions of the 
Constitution. Time and time again, there will be those in our broader community who do not wish 
to see constitutional rights protected, but that can never be a reason for a court not to protect those 
rights.”
48
Section 8(3) clearly indicates that constitutional rights, which are not adequately 
protected in legislation or the existing common law, must be vindicated through 
the development of new constitutionally inspired remedies. This resonates with the 
injunction of the court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In Re 
Ex Parte President RSA not to treat the common law and the constitution as two 
distinct spheres of law, but rather as a single system which “derives its force from 
the constitution and is subject to constitutional control”.49
2.2  Section 39(2)
Section 39(2) of the constitution imposes a general duty on every court, tribunal or 
forum when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law to “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights”.
As indicated above, section 8(3) requires courts to look to legislation in the first 
place to remedy infringements of constitutional rights by private parties. Section 
39(2) requires courts to interpret legislation, without unduly straining the legislative 
text and scheme,50 to protect and give effect to the rights and foundational constitu-
47 .2003 5 SA 301 (CC).
48 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) par 132 -156 and 171.
49 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) par 44.
50 In Investigating Directorate  Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v 
Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) par 24. 
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tional values.51 In the context of socio-economic rights, this implies that legislation 
should be interpreted to promote the purposes and values underlying these rights.52 
The purpose of these rights is to ensure that everyone has access to the socio-eco-
nomic goods and services referred to in the relevant provisions. These goods and 
services must be adequate in quality and quantity so as to facilitate the development 
of people to their full potential and their participation as equals in all spheres of our 
society. Legislation impacting on people’s socio-economic rights should therefore 
not be interpreted with a view to preserving as far as possible a common law norma-
tive baseline. Rather, such legislation should be constructed purposively to advance 
and protect the interests and values underpinning the relevant rights.
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,53 the constitutional court 
indicated that Act 19 of 1998 had to be interpreted in the light of section 26 (3) of the 
constitution. Interpreting this act through the lens of section 26(3) transforms the 
traditional common law-rules relating to eviction applications. Instead of “privileg-
ing in an abstract and mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to 
be possessed of a home, or vice versa”, courts must strive for a just solution which 
balances and reconciles the competing interests in the context of the specific case.54 
In Grobler v Msimanga,55 the high court gave a restrictive interpretation of the act, 
holding that “it could never have been the intention of the legislature to provide a 
discretion to a court to refuse an eviction order if a property owner is entitled to 
such an order, and therefore that the intention of the legislature was never to vary 
the common law in this regard”.56 According to the court this would constitute an 
expropriation or constructive expropriation, rendering the state liable for compen-
sation.57 Du Plessis AJ construed sections 4(7)-(12) of Act 19 of 1998 to be confined 
to the “principles and procedures according to which the courts should grant evic-
tion order, and in particular, to emphasize circumstances and facts which should be 
taken into account by the courts in formulating eviction orders”.58 This judgment 
does not sit comfortably with the transformative approach endorsed by the consti-
tutional court to the interpretation of the act in the Port Elizabeth Municipality case 
notwithstanding the fact that the latter case was concerned with an eviction at the 
instance of a public authority.59
51 See Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 273 (SCA) par 11; Hyundai Motor 
Distributors case (n 50) par 22.
52 An example of the interpretation of legislation (albeit in the context of litigation against a public 
authority) so as to promote the objectives and values underlying the right of access to adequate 
housing in s 26, is to be found in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 5 BCLR 
475 (CC). In this case, the constitutional court overruled the supreme court of appeal’s holding 
that a local authority was not obliged to consider relevant circumstances, including the availability 
of suitable alternative accommodation, before issuing a notice to residents to vacate their homes 
in terms of s 12(4)(b) when it “deems it necessary for the safety of any person”. The court said 
that “[t]he Supreme court of Appeal did not wholly embrace the inter-relationship between section 
12(4)(b) of the Act and s 26(2) of the constitution” (par 45).
53 (n 40).
54 See PE Municipality case (n 40) par 17-23 and 30-38.
55 case no 05/29099 (WLD) (judgment of 29 Feb 2008 unreported).
56 Grobler case (n 55) par 180. See the express reliance by the court on the presumption that “an Act 
does not alter the common law more than necessary” (par 136).
57 Grobler case (n 55) par 177.
58 Grobler case (n 55) par 180.
59 The shacks in question in the case were built on privately owned land: see the PE Municipality case 
(n 40) par 49.
TSAR 2008 . 3 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
474 LIEBENBERG
In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security,60 the constitutional court held 
that section 39(2) places a general duty on the courts to develop the common law and 
customary law so that it is consonant with the “objective normative value system” 
established by the constitution.61 Section 39(2) indicates that the development of the 
common law and customary law must be guided not only by the textual provisions 
of the particular rights protected in the bill of rights, but by the underlying purposes, 
values and spirit of the bill of rights. The court’s duty is “to promote” the underlying 
normative purposes and values of the bill of rights in developing common law and 
customary law. This suggests an active attempt to bring common law and custom-
ary law rules and doctrines into alignment with the spirit and values of the bill of 
rights. As O’Regan J states in K v Minister of Safety and Security:
“The overall purpose of s 39(2) is to ensure that our common law is infused with the values of the 
Constitution. It is not only in cases where existing rules are clearly inconsistent with the Consti-
tution that such an infusion is required. The normative influence of the Constitution must be felt 
throughout the common law. Courts making decisions which involve the incremental development 
of the rules of the common law in cases where the values of the Constitution are relevant are there-
fore also bound by the terms of s 39(2). The obligation imposed upon courts by s 39(2) of the Consti-
tution is thus extensive, requiring courts to be alert to the normative framework of the Constitution 
not only when some startling new development of the common law is in issue, but in all cases where 
the incremental development of the rule is in issue.” 
62
As a number of legal scholars have pointed out, a significant constraining factor on 
the transformation of common law doctrines and rules under the influence of the 
normative value system of the constitution is the nature of legal culture63 in South 
Africa and the understanding of the “internal logic” and processes through which 
common law development takes place.64 According to this understanding the in-
herent nature of the common law is that its evolution or development takes place 
incrementally in accordance with its own conceptual structures and doctrines on a 
case-by-case basis to fill gaps in the law. The legislature is understood to be the ap-
propriate institution, given its democratic legitimacy, to bring about any far-reach-
ing changes in the doctrinal structure and normative content of the common law.65 
The influence of this understanding of the common law continues as a powerful 
undercurrent in the constitutional era.66 It runs beneath the surface of the contro-
versy regarding the nature and extent to which the bill of rights should influence 
developments in various spheres of the common law, and the respective roles of 
the judiciary and legislature in realising constitutional rights. It is also manifest in 
arguments that the values which the constitution proclaims as foundational to the 
60 (n 9) par 54. 
61 See also S v Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) par 27-28.
62 (n 12) par 17.
63 See Klare “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” 1998 SAJHR 146; Van der Walt 
“Legal history, legal culture and transformation in a constitutional democracy” 2006 Fundamina 
1. 
64 Van der Walt (n 63) 7-8. 
65 Van der Walt (n 63) 8-9. However, as the discussion above in relation to the Grobler case (n 55) 
indicates, there is still a tendency to interpret social legislation restrictively in the light of background 
common law principles. 
66 See the cautious approach to reforming the common law suggested by the constitutional court in 
Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1998 4 SA 753 (CC) par 55 and the Masiya case 
(n 9) par 31.
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democratic order are already “inherent” in the common law thus obviating the need 
for any dramatic changes.67
There is an evident tension between the notion of common law development 
requiring gradual, cautious changes, and the transformative character of the con-
stitution which envisages substantive change in both public and private patterns 
of socio-economic disadvantage and marginalisation.68 This tension is particularly 
manifest in the sphere of the horizontal application of socio-economic rights given 
the absence of a conceptual foundation in our existing common law for recognising 
everyone’s entitlement to have access to adequate to socio-economic resources and 
services. In this sphere, the unarticulated privileging of conceptions of negative 
liberty and rights constitutes a significant constraint on the development of positive 
duties on both public and private agencies to advance equitable access to socio-
economic rights.69
Nowhere is this more evident than in the narrow and formalistic interpretation 
given to socio-economic rights in contractual disputes.70 In Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom,71 the supreme court of appeal rejected a challenge to a clause in a contract 
between a patient and a private hospital exempting the hospital from liability for the 
negligence of its staff. The respondent alleged that the exemption clause was con-
trary to the public interest which had to be interpreted, as required by section 39(2), 
to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights, particularly the right of 
access to health care services in section 27(1)(a) of the constitution.72 Alternatively, 
it was argued that the cause was unenforceable as it was unreasonable, unfair and 
in conflict with the principle of bona fides. The court acknowledged that the notion 
of public policy had to be interpreted in the light of the rights and values enshrined 
in the constitution.73 According to the court, the respondent correctly conceded 
that the exemption clause was not in conflict with section 27(1)(a) in that it did not 
prevent access to health care services, and that it did not prohibit hospitals from 
insisting on legally acceptable conditions for the rendering of medical services. The 
respondent’s argument was that the clause was contrary to the public interest in 
that it undermined a core value protected by section 27(1)(a), namely the rendering 
of medical services in a professional, non-negligent manner.74 The court rejected 
this interpretation on the basis that the hospital nursing staff’s professional con-
duct was secured by relevant professional codes and the sanction of damage to the 
67 For an insightful discussion of the disjuncture encountered in the jurisprudence between a transfor-
mative interpretation of the foundational constitutional values of human dignity, freedom and equal-
ity and a preservative, classic liberal interpretation, see Bhana and Pieterse “Towards a reconcilia-
tion of contract law and constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox revisited” 2005 SALJ 865 876-884. 
See also the following debate: Cook and Quixley “Parate executie clauses: is the debate dead?” 2004 
SALJ 719-730; Scott “A private-law dinosaur’s evaluation of summary execution clauses in light of 
the constitution” 2007 THRHR 289-299. 
68 Klare (n 63); Pieterse “What do we mean when we talk about transformative constitutionalism” 2005 
SAPR/PL 155; Liebenberg “Needs, rights and transformation: adjudicating social rights” 2006 Stell 
LR 5.
69 See Barber “Fallacies of negative constitutionalism” 2007 Fordham L Rev 651. On the conceptual 
power of negative liberty and rights in South African constitutional law, see Woolman and Davis 
“The last laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, classical liberalism, creole liberalism and the application of 
rights under the interim and final constitutions” 1996 SAJHR 361.
70 On the relevance of socio-economic rights to the law of contract, see Pearmain “Contracting for 
socio-economic rights: A contradiction in terms?” (1) 2006 THRHR 287 and (2) 2006 THRHR 466. 
71 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA).
72 Afrox case par 15-16.
73 Afrox case par 8.
74 Afrox case par 20.
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hospital’s reputation and non-competitiveness should its staff render services in a 
negligent manner. Furthermore, the competing “constitutional” value of contractual 
autonomy75 which finds expression in the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda militated 
against the interpretation argued for by the respondent. The court’s reasoning rests 
on a particularly formalistic and impoverished interpretation of section 27(1)(a) and 
the values and interests it protects. Section 39(2) specifically mandates the courts 
to transcend a literal interpretation of the relevant provisions and to look to their 
“spirit, purport and objects”. The right of access to health care services incorporates 
a qualitative dimension in international law and implies the rendering of services to 
an appropriate professional and scientific standard.76 Moreover, the court provides 
no substantive reasoning as to why the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda should be 
preferred in the specific circumstances of the case over the value of ensuring a 
remedy to those who suffer damages as a result of negligent medical care. The lat-
ter value has its origin in the constitutionally enshrined right of access to health 
care services – one of the socio-economic rights which the constitutional court has 
held are fundamental to the transformative objectives of the constitution.77 Sanctity 
of contract, on the other hand, as Pearmain points out, “is not a right in the bill of 
rights. It is a principle of the common law that is not inconsistent with the constitu-
tion in certain, but not all, circumstances”.78 The court in the Afrox case treated the 
contract in question as simply another commercial transaction instead of evaluating 
the public policy considerations relating to the enforcement of the exemption clause 
in the light of the special nature of a contract between a patient and a hospital for the 
provision of health care services.79 This was a contract for the provision of a consti-
tutionally enshrined right and the values and interests which this right protects, as 
well as the inequalities in bargaining power inherent in relationships between health 
service providers and patients,80 should have played a far greater role in the court’s 
evaluation of enforceability of the exemption clause.
The decision in the Afrox case can be contrasted to the more substantive reason-
ing adopted by Satchwell J in Mpange v Sithole81 in developing the common-law 
remedies of specific performance and reduction of rental in the context of a land-
lord’s duty to maintain the premises let in a reasonably fit condition. It has generally 
been assumed that the lessee will be in a position to undertake the repairs him or 
herself and recover the costs from the lessor either in the form of a set-off against 
75 The court cited Cameron J’s concurring judgment in Brisley v Drotsky (n 34) at par 94 in which the 
value of contractual autonomy was related to the constitutional values of freedom and dignity.
76 See the interpretation by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the right to 
health in article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General 
Comment No 14 (Twenty-second session, 2000), UN doc E/C12/2000/4, par [12] (d). See further 
Pieterse (n 24) 166-167.
77 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) par 8-9; the Grootboom case 
(n 20) par 23. 
78 Pearmain (n 70) 299. For further critiques of the Afrox decision (n 71), see Naudé and Lubbe “Exemp-
tion clauses – a rethink occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom” 2005 SALJ 441; Bhana and 
Pieterse (n 67) 865; Tladi “One step forward, two steps back for constitutionalising the common 
law: Afrox Health Care v Strydom” 2002 SAPR/PL 473; Brand “Disclaimers in hospital admission 
contracts and constitutional health rights” 2002 ESR Review 17.
79 See further Naudé and Lubbe (n 78) 459-462.
80 The court held that there was no evidence indicating that the respondent was in a weaker bargaining 
position than the appellant hospital at the time of the conclusion of the contract (the Afrox case (n 71) 
par 12).
81 2007 6 SA 578 (W).
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the rental or in a claim against the lessor.82 However, as Satchwell J pointed out this 
option is not easily available to poor tenants (such as the one’s before the court) who 
lack the resources and skills to undertake the renovations required to render the 
premises habitable. Accordingly, courts should exercise their discretion in favour 
of specific performance in circumstances where the tenants are too poor to cover 
the costs of repairing the building themselves.83 Such development is indicated by 
the values underpinning the right of access to adequate housing in section 26(1) of 
the constitution84 as well as the rights to dignity and privacy in sections 10 and 14. 
Although the remedy of specific performance could not be awarded in the case as 
the registered owner of the property had not been joined, the court granted a remedy 
in the form of an interdict against the landlord from charging a specified reduced 
rental.85 In this regard the court also departed from a line of cases which held that 
where a lessee remains in occupation of the premises let, he or she remains liable for 
the full rental even though they do not have full use and enjoyment thereof.86
In conclusion, section 39(2) requires the courts when adjudicating run-of-the-mill 
commercial, contractual, family and property law cases to consider whether applica-
ble common and customary law principles require development to give effect to the 
underlying purposes and values of the bill of rights, including the socio-economic 
rights provisions. Underlying these provisions is a concern to ensure that people 
have access to adequate resources and social services, and that greater equity and 
social justice in the sphere of socio-economic relations in South Africa is promoted. 
This understanding emerges particularly when an approach to the interpretation of 
the bill of rights is adopted which takes the interrelationship between rights such as 
socio-economic rights and the right to equality seriously. Thus, for example, section 
9(2) of the constitution defines equality to include “the full and equal enjoyment of 
all rights and freedoms”. This includes the socio-economic rights in the constitu-
tion.87 The courts should therefore not adopt a narrow, formalistic textual analysis 
to the relevant socio-economic rights provisions when developing the common law 
in terms of section 39(2) in areas of private law which impact on people’s access to 
resources and services.88
82 Mpange case (n 81) par 37 and cases cited at n 20 of the judgment. 
83 Mpange case (n 81) par 36-58.
84 The court referred in this regard to the qualitative dimension of the right to adequate housing as 
well as the need for effective remedies against landlords who fail to maintain dwellings let in an 
adequate and healthy condition endorsed by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in General Comment No 4 (Sixth session, 1991) The Right to Adequate Housing (a 11(1) of the 
Covenant), UN doc E/1992/23 par 8 and 17.
85 Mpange (n 81), par 64-74; 83-89.
86 See the cases cited in Mpange (n 81) par 66 and n 35. 
87 On the implications of an interdependent interpretation of equality and socio-economic rights, see 
Grootboom (n 20) par 23; Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social 
Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) par 40-45. See further Liebenberg and Goldblatt “The interrela-
tionship between equality and socio-economic rights under South Africa’s transformative constitu-
tion” 2007 SAJHR 335.
88 In Barkhuizen v Napier (n 8), the constitutional court gave a restrictive interpretation of the impact 
of the constitutional right of access to courts (s 34) on the validity of a 90 day time limitation clause 
for instituting legal proceeding in a standard-form short-term insurance contract. The court held 
that this clause was not so unreasonable or unfair that it offended against public policy or good faith 
in that no evidence had been provided by the applicant for his failure to comply with the clause. 
Contrast the detailed contextual and substantive reasoning in the minority judgments of Sachs J and 
Moseneke DCJ finding that public policy, informed by constitutional rights and values, dictated that 
the time-bar clause should not be enforced in the particular circumstances. 
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2.3  Development of existing common law remedies or the creation of a new 
constitutional remedy?
The question as to when it is appropriate to develop existing common law remedies 
and doctrines to give effect to constitutional rights and values or to develop an en-
tirely new remedy sourced in the constitution is complex. This question is relevant 
whether the path taken to the horizontal application of constitutional rights is sec-
tion 8 (2) read with (3), or section 39(2).
This is illustrated by the case law dealing with the relationship between com-
mon law and constitutional remedies to vindicate constitutional rights. Although 
these cases involved organs of state as parties, the issues canvassed are relevant 
also to the interaction between common law and constitutional remedies in private 
disputes. In Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality,89 the supreme court of appeal was reluctant to develop the common-
law remedy of the mandament van spolie to provide the relief of reconstruction 
of dwellings unlawfully destroyed by municipal officials, but chose rather to craft 
a remedy “special to the constitution”90 to provide this relief. The court did not 
clearly say which constitutional provisions this remedy was based on, but it appears 
from the judgment to be based primarily on section 26(3) read in conjunction with 
the foundational constitutional value of the rule of law.91 The court, per Cameron 
J, stated:
“The Constitution preserves the common law, but requires the Courts to synchronise it with the 
Bill of Rights. This entails that common-law provisions at odds with the Constitution must either 
be developed or put at nought; but it does not mean that every common-law mechanism, institution 
or doctrine needs constitutional overhaul; nor does it mean that where a remedy for a constitutional 
infraction is required, a common law figure with an analogous operation must necessarily be seized 
upon for its development. On the contrary: it may sometimes be best to leave a common-law institu-
tion untouched, and to craft a new constitutional remedy entirely.”
92
The judgment does not offer much guidance as to the circumstances in which it 
would be appropriate to develop existing common-law remedies to give effect to a 
constitutional right or craft an entirely new constitutional cause of action based on 
the right in question.93
In President of RSA v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd both the supreme court of 
appeal and the constitutional court granted relief to a private landowner in the form 
of an award of constitutional damages against the state for failing to assist the owner 
to execute an eviction order obtained in terms of Act 19 of 1998 against a large 
community occupying the land in question.94 The supreme court of appeal engaged 
directly with the central issue at stake in the case – the clash between the landown-
er’s property rights and the right of access to housing of the unlawful occupiers, and 
89 2007 6 SA 511 (SCA).
90 Tswelopele case par 27.
91 Tswelopele case par 2 and 25-26. 
92 Tswelopele case par 20 (footnotes omitted).
93 For an argument that a restrictive interpretation of the mandament van spolie in the specific context 
of the destruction of an informal dwelling “that can quickly, easily and cheaply be replaced using 
fungible and even used materials” is unnecessary and out of step with the values and interests 
protected by s 26, see Van der Walt “Developing the law on unlawful squatting and spoliation” 
forthcoming in SALJ 2008. As Van der Walt points out, the requirements for this new constitutional 
remedy and its scope of application are unclear. 
94 Modderfontein Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) par 41-44; 51-52; 
President of RSA v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) par 53-68.
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the state’s responsibilities to protect and promote both these rights in the context 
of evictions.95 The constitutional court, on the other hand, preferred to locate the 
owner’s remedy in the safer territory of the right of access to court protected in sec-
tion 34 and the rule of law enshrined in section 1(c) of the constitution.96
In deciding whether to develop existing common law remedies or to fashion an 
entirely new remedy based on constitutional provisions, a judge should locate the 
existing common law applicable to a particular field in its historical context as well 
as examine its current social and economic consequences to determine whether its 
development would facilitate the achievement of greater social and economic jus-
tice.97 For example, Van der Walt points out that given the central role of property 
law in serving the colonial and apartheid project in South Africa, it is appropriate 
to reconsider “the underlying structure of the property regime and its effect on the 
entrenchment of privilege and power embodied in property holdings” whenever the 
courts have to consider the appropriateness of common-law remedies in a particular 
case.98 In other cases, such as Modderklip, the more effective form of relief may be 
a remedy based directly on the relevant constitutional provisions.99
3  Conclusion
Until the nettle of the fundamental changes which the constitution intended to bring 
about in our entire political and legal order is grasped, the transformative potential 
of the socio-economic rights entrenched in the bill of rights will remain unrealised. 
There are undoubtedly many complex questions associated with the development of 
the common law under constitutional influence. These include how to fundamen-
tally change the common law without undermining the coherence and predictability 
of our legal system as a whole, and the appropriate institutional space to allow to the 
legislature to adopt holistic legislation, through a broadly participatory process, to 
give effect to constitutional rights and values.
However, the complexities of the task and the measure of uncertainty inherent 
in a transforming legal and political order do not relieve the courts of their duty to 
closely scrutinise existing common law and customary law rules for their conso-
nance with the rights, values and purposes of the constitution. Where the existing 
law fails to give effect to these rights and values, it must be changed, sometimes 
fundamentally. As Froneman J stated in the court a quo in Kate v MEC for the De-
partment of Welfare, Eastern Cape:
“[T]he Judge who fails to examine the existing law with a view to ensuring the effective realisation 
of constitutional rights and values that were not recognised before is not, as is so often presumed by 
proponents of this course, merely neutrally and objectively applying the law. That will only ever be 
true if the existing common law proceeds from a fair and equal baseline, an assumption that will not 
95 Modderklip (SCA) case par 16-17, 21-28, 
96 Modderklip (CC) case par 39-51.
97 One of the fundamental purposes of the adoption of the constitution is to “establish a society based 
on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights” (preamble).
98 Van der Walt (n 93). 
99 See also MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA). The supreme 
court of appeal confirmed an award of damages in the form of backpay and interest for an unlawful 
delay in the payment of a social grant in terms of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992. The court 
held that a direct constitutional remedy, as opposed to an indirect common law remedy of delictual 
damages, ensured the more effective and flexible relief required to vindicate the egregious breaches 
of the constitutional rights of access to social assistance and administrative justice at issue in the 
case (see particularly par 26-27).
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often be open to the present judiciary in South Africa in cases such as the present, given our unequal 
past. More often than not such a supine approach will effectively result in a choice for the retention 
of an unequal and unjust status quo.”100
This applies with equal force in the area of private law, which has a deep and per-
vasive influence on people’s ability to gain access to the socio-economic rights 
promised by our constitution. All forms of power which impede people’s access to 
socio-economic rights should be subject to constitutional scrutiny and substantive 
evaluation in terms of purposes and values promoted by these rights.
SAMEVATTING
DIE TOEPASSING VAN SOSIO-EKONOMIESE REGTE OP DIE PRIVAATREG
In verskeie dele van die privaatreg struktureer bestaande reëls van die gemenereg toegang tot sosio-
ekonomiese hulpbronne. Teen hierdie agtergrond word geargumenteer dat a 8(2) van die grondwet vereis 
dat die howe nie ligtelik bevind dat ’n besondere verpligting wat opgelê is deur ’n sosio-ekonomiese 
bepaling in die grondwet in ’n dispuut tussen private partye nie van toepassing is nie. Die outeur dui ook 
aan dat a 8(3) vereis dat waar fundamentele regte nie voldoende beskerming in bestaande wetgewing of 
gemeenregtelike reëls geniet nie, nuwe grondwetlik-geïnspireerde remedies ontwikkel moet word. Die 
outeur betoog voorts dat howe nie ’n formalistiese- of teksgebaseerde benadering moet volg wanneer 
hulle gemeenregtelike reëls ingevolge a 39(2) ontwikkel om die gees, strekking en oogmerke van die 
sosio-ekonomiese regte in die handves van regte te bevorder nie. Laastens betoog die outeur dat die 
roete na ’n effektiewe remedie, afhangend van die konteks, langs a 8(2) en (3) of a 39(2) te vinde kan 
wees. Die kompleksiteit van die ontwikkeling van bestaande privaatregtelike reëls onder die invloed van 
sosio-ekonomiese regte bevry nie die regsprekende gesag van ’n plig om bestaande reëls en instellings 
noukeurig te ondersoek vir hul verenigbaarheid met dié regte en hulle onderliggende waardes nie.
100 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) par 16.
